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ABSTRACT

Anecdotal evidence suggests that the Federal IMD exclusion has resulted in states opting
to shift costs to the government by enacting inefficient Medicaid programs in order to gain
federal reimbursement. The claim of “cost-shifting” relies on the assumption that state programs
are inefficient – that is, that their Medicaid programs are less effective at reducing incarceration
rates (as a metric for failure to properly treat) than their psychiatric hospitals. Literature in the
Public Health, Psychiatric, and Criminal Justice fields was surveyed in order to determine
relevant factors to be included in the model. Model variables include factors which contribute to
mental illness, criminal data, and relevant state expenditures. Availability of data drove inevitable
bias in selection of time frame and variables in multiple regressions using data from 2000 to 2010
across the fifty states. Upon analysis, the data do not support the claims made by the Treatment
Advocacy Center that the IMD exemption has compromised the welfare of the Mentally Ill.
However, the bias created by data selection is substantial enough to limit a conclusion of full
support for the null; ultimately this study confirms the need for a more cross-sectional data on the
subject.

Keywords: IMD, state, health, cost, mental, regression
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION
The United States federal government’s Medicaid program is a public insurance program
which provides medical care for individuals with low incomes and disabilities. Though its
coverage extends to mental health services, it has the notable exemption of coverage for inpatient
psychiatric hospitalization at an Institute for Mental Disease. This distinction has drawn the ire of
mental health advocates who claim that it creates a perverse incentive for states to expand
community-based mental health coverage at the expense of medically necessary inpatient care
(Jaffe & Zdanowicz, 1999). Advocacy groups such as the Treatment Advocacy Center have
produced data which states that there are currently more mentally ill individuals in America’s
prisons than there are in its mental hospitals (Fellner, 2006).
Mental illness accounts for a substantial portion of human services expenses for the
federal and state governments of the United States. By crude estimates, mental illness and
associated conditions use some 15 percent of Medicaid dollars by way of skilled nursing facilities,
intermediate care facilities, state hospitals and general hospital psychiatric facilities (Taube,
Goldman, & Salkever, 1990). In addition to the high Medicaid costs of mental illness, prisons
certainly are carrying a growing number of mentally ill inmates (Diamond, Wang, Holzer,
Thomas, & Cruser, 2001). Human rights advocates blame the ineffective provision of mental
health services for this trend, positing that the trans-institutionalization of the mentally ill is the
1

expression of a faulty system (Fellner, 2006). A survey of academic literature suggests that on
the macroeconomic level no study has directly examined the factors which affect the proportion
of mentally ill inmates. This study takes the approach of holding the null hypothesis that no
trans-institutionalization has taken place. By examining data which act as proxies to system
failures such as violence, homelessness, and incarceration rates, this study will attempt to uncover
the extent to which the federal IMD exemption affects the state decision-making process.
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CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

The first factor to be analyzed is the nature of the mentally ill population itself. In a
broad study by Wells et al., psychiatric disorder was defined as a case of major depression,
dysthyma, or generalized anxiety disorder, probable panic disorder, or probable severe mental
illness (as assessed by a positive score on the composite international diagnostic interview stem
item for lifetime mania or from a report of ever having had an overnight hospital stay for
psychotic symptoms or of having received a diagnosis of schizophrenia from a physician) (Wells,
Klap, Koike, & Sherbourne, 2001). This metric is not perfect for an economic analysis because
the diagnostic measures used for non-serious mental illnesses have a high variance from state to
state. Race may be specifically collinear to access to or quality of care, since Wells et al. found
that racial differences affected access and quality, although the significance of race diminished
(but did not disappear) when income, marital status and private insurances status were controlled.
This study’s definition is difficult to quantify across fifty states with differing standards for
diagnosis, and its focus on ethnic differences in care can be addressed in a macro-level study by
grouping various study populations by race. However, the diminished prominence of race when
accounting for varied factors, the difficulty of tracking racial expression when studying the fifty
states at a distance, and limited data from state providers make the metric one worth notice but
not use in this paper.
3

As an alternative to state government-implemented screenings, psychiatric diagnostic
standards present a more uniform measure of mental illness. For example, Wang et al. conducted
a nationwide study which surveyed households and classified mental illness according to the
standards of the DSM-IV. They found that the severity of an individual’s mental disorder was a
significant factor in determining what type of mental health service was used (such as specialty
mental health providers, general medical health, or talk therapy with a psychiatrist). The study
found that the type of care being utilized by individuals has shifted over time, implying that the
year could substantially affect the structure of care. (Wang, Demler, Olfson, Pincus, Wells, &
Kessler, 2006). Wang et al. excluded the institutionalized and the homeless from their survey,
which represents a problem for use in a study of trans-institutionalization given the high
prevalence of mental illness among the non-surveyed population. Moreover, their emphasis on
individual care-seeking patterns did little to address the incentive structure that drives state
systems of care. A broader analysis can circumvent these problems by taking into account rates
of homelessness across states. This not only serves as a means of capturing access to that
population but can also test the relationship between homelessness, crime, and mental illness. A
linear relationship between the prevalence of mental illness and the homeless population is
asserted by Wells, et al. and establishes a dependent variable with which data from 2006 may be
analyzed (Wells, Klap, Koike, & Sherbourne, 2001).
McAlpine & Mechanic confirm that the severely mentally ill population is skewed by
race, marital status, sex, education level, and family income, and that 3/5ths of its population
received no specialty care. They also find that the severely mentally ill have a comparatively low
4

degree of insurance coverage and that 37 percent of the seriously ill population received Medicaid
or Medicare, which increased the likelihood of reception of specialty care by a factor of six
(McAlpine & Mechanic, 2000). The researchers used the Healthcare for Communities survey,
which is a national study that tracks alcohol, drug and mental health services utilization by
conducting a telephone survey in 60 communities across the United States. This source of data
seems to be of great value to many researchers in the literature, but has limited cross-state
comparison. Moreover, the survey data has a high cost as it is private, and the affordability of
data is a premium in this study. However, it does bring to bear an attack on the notion of a
perverse incentive; even if community-based mental health services are sub-par to mental
hospitals, their greater affordability and wider coverage may be an effective means of allocation
by the metric of reducing homelessness or incarceration, because they allow individuals to
maintain Medicaid coverage at relatively low cost to the state.
Medicaid is especially prevalent in the provision of services to the indigent mentally ill,
but estimates of federal expenditures are fairly crude (Taube, Goldman, & Salkever, 1990).
Taube et al. use the size of the enrolled population and break down Medicaid-using population
into heavy, episodic, and persistent users when analyzing data. The services utilized by each
population tended to vary, so while this study cannot track the type of user, it can include a
variable for the budget and availability of specialty services. These services could be divided
between state institutions and community institutions. The former do not receive Medicaid
reimbursements from patients; the latter do.

5

A commonly occurring standard for designating an individual as having a serious mental
illness was a diagnosis of schizophrenia or Major Affective Disorder along with at least one
inpatient or two outpatient treatment contacts for such diagnosis was used to count serious mental
illness. In one stuch study, utilization rates for Medicaid and line-item cost of care were used to
determine the financial impact of serious mental illness (Rothbard, Metraux, & Blank, 2003).
In another study by Soumeral et al., Medicaid enrollment files were controlled for age,
race, sex, and monthly category of enrollment. Medicaid drug claims and psychiatric admissions
of patients with schizophrenia were available for use in the study and represent a clear path to the
utilization of Medicaid services in the United States. Because Medicaid does not cover inpatient
psychiatric hospitals with more than 16 beds, medical records were used to track individual
admission to hospitals (Soumerai, McLaughlin, Ross-Degnan, Casteris, & Bollini, 1994). The
study may have been skewed by a medication cap in place in New Hampshire at the time,
suggesting that data should use medical caps as a variable. Because this study does not aim to
track individual patients but rather the larger structures that affect broader trends, hospital
utilization rates, which are available for state-operated institutions but do not offer individual data,
should suffice as a metric for estimating access to inpatient care. Utilization rates were limited in
comparison to cross-sectional data, but later assumptions demonstrate the use of state
expenditures as a proxy.
Wells et al. found that publicly insured minorities were reported as more likely to make
use of available mental health services than their non-Hispanic white counterparts (Wells, Klap,
6

Koike, & Sherbourne, 2001), further confirming the need for racial data by state. Census data
tracks race in a way that provides a solid baseline but is so limited in its application that race
becomes a question of estimate rather than certainty for a study between 2000 and 2009.
Substance abuse is another factor which has substantial interaction with the mentally ill
(Drake, et al., 2001), so availability of substance abuse counseling and the per capita allocation
for substance abuse rehabilitation should be controlled. For impacts helpful and harmful, states
include substance abuse treatment in expenditure lists for mental illness. The collinear
relationship between the two factors makes it difficult to disentangle one from the other, but may
not be a problem, considering how much the two have in common.
An analysis of the interplay between mental health services and incarceration rates must
control for environmental factors that affect behavior. Mental illness is generally associated with
low socio-economic status, which in itself may be a causal factor for contact with the criminal
justice system. A study by Draine et al., which focused on the role poverty played alongside
mental illness and criminal justice interaction, found that when status is put into the criminal
activity regression, the significance of mental illness is reduced. Despite seeming to decrease the
importance of mental health, Draine et al. focused primarily on tracking individuals rather than
the structural factors that exist on the macroeconomic level (Draine, Salzer, Culhane, & Hadley,
2002). The relationship between social status, mental illness, and crime is an important one but
by no means does it delegitimize the importance of examining the relationship between
generosity of the state mental health services program and incarceration rates, especially given
7

the resistance of severe mental illnesses to treatment and the widespread secondary impacts of
effective care. Gross State Product, Food Stamp Programs, and employment are all valid
measures for mental illness. The Food Stamp Program seems most appropriate as it measures
levels of low poverty without bias from high-income individuals.
The hypothesis that the size and scope of a mental health program affect incarceration
rates should be compared to the assertions of Draine et al. by adding income level to the equation.
Ideally this could be done by listing the mean and median incomes of the incarcerated mentally ill
and general population and by listing the mean and median incomes of the control population and
mentally ill population outside of prison. However, income data is typically gained from a survey
and the mentally ill population is disproportionately indigent; this data could be extremely
difficult to gather in certain states depending on how much effort goes into surveying the
homeless and transient populations as well as the threshold for privacy. Privacy concerns, while
justified, make patient tracking extremely difficult, so this study ought to focus on broader trends
in income level on the state-by-state level.
Access to medication is a significant component of the effectiveness of the Medicaid
program. Soumeral et al. found that a cap on the amount of medication covered by Medicaid had
a profound impact on incarceration and homelessness rates, and that lifting the cap brought those
rates back to baseline (Soumerai, McLaughlin, Ross-Degnan, Casteris, & Bollini, 1994).
Soumeral et al. focused specifically on individual medication need and were able to make use of
medicine claims. Once again Medicaid data can be helpful in obtaining this information,
8

although this study will not track individual increase or decrease in medication across time. As of
this writing, an adequate measure for medication could not be found, but the importance of
medication to a policymaker requires that the search be continued.
Contact with the criminal justice system increases the likelihood of receiving specialty
care by a factor of four for the seriously mentally ill (McAlpine & Mechanic, 2000). There are a
growing number of individuals with mental illness in prison, but there are confounding factors
such as an overall increase in arrest rates and new legislation that increases the time offenders
spend in prison (Diamond, Wang, Holzer, Thomas, & Cruser, 2001). Diamond et al. indicated
that federal law requires a basic screening for mental illness in all new inmates but that further
studies within the population were subject to varying observational biases. Another study found
that within prisons, gender affected whether services are provided, to the point that Baskin et al.
argue that gender is a stronger predictor for the type or quality of mental health services provided
than a prisoner’s clinical status (Baskin, Sommers, Tessler, & Steadman, 1989). Gender
breakdown within each service system should be utilized to address this bias. Although prison
mental health services may not be as ideal as non-prison mental services, their prevalence may
make statistical significance difficult to determine. If the dependent variable of a study is
imprisonment, one could argue that both a positive and negative relationship between
incarceration rates and mental health treatment are possible.
It is clear that the environment surrounding the mentally ill in American society is a fairly
complex one. The review in literature suggests that these individuals have a high degree of
9

contact with government services ranging from healthcare to broader social services to prison.
Most studies in the literature focus on tracking individuals in order to focus on quality of care.
Those that focused on broader questions attempted to glean from data a particular question such
as the true size of the mentally ill prison population. The survey conducted was not inconsistent
with anecdotal findings that indicate the need for mental health services and the relationship
between treatment and incarceration. This implies a model whereby the dependent variable is an
expression of “system failure” such as homelessness or incarceration. Independent variables
attempt to capture state-controllable efforts representing the variables that affect the mentally ill
individual. State budgets are separately considered as independent variables and include the
following: State expenditures within the prison system, state expenditures on mental hospitals,
state expenditures on community-based mental health care, the size of the overall state Medicaid
and Medicare programs, Other independent variables not directly within state control but
significant to the model include Gross State Product, population, and the federal Medicaid match
ratio.
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CHAPTER 3

DATA AND METHODS

The majority of data for this study was provided by the Kaiser Family Foundation, which
collects, aggregates, and publishes data from the fifty states, the District of Colombia, and
American territories free to the public (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2011). Data collected
included the following: Distribution of population by federal poverty level for the year 2009, the
average number of monthly food stamp participants for the years 2002-2010, Distribution of
General fund spending for the year 2009, Gross State Product for the years 2002 and 2005-2009,
the Adult population in state prisons for the years 1999-2009, total Medicaid spending for the
year 2009, Violent crime per 100,000 persons for the year 2009, Homeless population estimates
for 2009, expenses per inpatient day for hospitals for the year 2009, per-capita state mental health
agency expenditures for the year 2006, and the number of mental health care organizations for the
years 1992, 1994, 1998, and 2000. The National Association of State Mental Health Program
Directors, which has extensive data specific to mental health care for recent years, provided
information on Medicaid beneficiaries and payments for the year 2006, the Federal Medicaid
Multiplier for the years 2004-2008, and state expenditures for hospital care and community-based
care for the years 2006-2008 (NASMHPD Research Institute, 2007).
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Gaps in data led to reductions in regression potential. Multiple studies were run to test
the existence of a standing relationship similar to that indicated in literature. Since 2006 and
2009 had the most extensive data, each was subjected to a cross-sectional study of available
factors. For the years for which federal Medicaid reimbursement rates were known, a
rudimentary panel was used to examine the relationship between federal rates and state provision
of mental health services.
The following models were tested:
Mental Health Spending per Capita as a linear function of GSP per capita, the cost of overall
hospital inpatient care per day, and the federal Medicaid multiplier for the year 2006
Crime per capita as a linear function of mental health spending per capita, GSP per capita, the
natural log of state population, and the federal Medicaid multiplier for the year 2006
Violent crime per 100,000 citizens as a linear function of the per-capita share of the state
corrections budget, the proportion of citizens living below the poverty line, per-capita Medicaid
spending, and GSP per capita for the year 2009
State expenditure on mental hospitals as a function of state expenditure on community care, the
federal Medicaid multiplier, Gross State Product, and hospital care expenses via panel data for
years 2006-2008
State expenditure on mental hospitals as a function of the federal Medicaid multiplier, Gross State
Product, and the number of food stamp enrollees for the years 2006, 2007, and 2008 separately
12

Tests were run for heteroskedasticity. Because of the ease with which it can be viewed
alongside the standard regression, White’s correction for heteroskedasticity was run on each
model.
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Figure 3.1: Descriptive statistics for 2006, 2007, 2008, and 2009
2006
Variable
Food Stamps
GSP
HospExpens
FedMedicaidShare
IncarcerationRate
Prisoners
StateHospitalCare
CommunityCare

Mean
514152.53
257584.67
1545.03
0.6034898
409.0000000
27198.14
167.1020408
425.0816327

StdDev
543407.40
320215.89
366.4776991
0.0790014
143.2106549
35808.58
208.2102548
670.1380404

Minimum
24236
23651
773.5700000
0.5000000
151.0000000
1363.00
15.0000000
21.0000000

Maximum
2622548.00
1800779.00
2455.24
0.7600000
846.0000000
175512.00
1108.00
3519.00

Mean
510407.53
273660.43
1616.05
0.5972857
403.2040816
27031.78
180.3151020
473.1951020

StdDev
525394.36
336751.31
399.2385988
0.0823439
144.4166397
35929.07
222.2826171
761.1291599

Minimum
22608.00
24284.00
869.1239350
0.5000000
159.0000000
174282.00
16.9500000
22.2600000

Maximum
2422198.00
1883679.00
2489.63
0.7589000
865.0000000
174282.00
1173.20
3860.35

Mean
546780.69
277665.08
1715.06
0.5986204
412.5102041
27816.43
187.0216327
518.6818367

StdDev
566171.27
344670.96
398.7669916
0.0809993
147.0225496
1452.00
242.2638610
823.4734073

Minimum
22608.00
25225.00
928.9800000
0.5000000
151.0000000
173670.00
10.8400000
23.6100000

Maximum
2532047.00
1921493.00
2512.19
0.7629000
853.0000000
173670.00
1207.30
4267.21

2007
Variable
Food Stamps
GSP
HospExpens
FedMedicaidShare
IncarcerationRate
Prisoners
StateHospitalCare
CommunityCare
2008
Variable
Food Stamps
GSP
HospExpens
FedMedicaidShare
IncarcerationRate
Prisoners
StateHospitalCare
CommunityCare
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2009
Variable

Mean

% of Population below
100 % of poverty level

0.

% of population below
125% of poverty level
% of population
receiving food stamps

Std Dev

Minimum

Maximum

1766857

0.0380818

0.1072203

0.2776364

0.0734193

0.0116562

0.0474861

0.0991997

682274.95

26762.00

3003156.00

666776.90

Medicaid spending (in
millions)

2067.26

2646.49

142.0000000

11707.00

Corrections spending
(in millions)

944.0200000

1417.22

67.0000000

9316.00

Total spending (in
millions)

13134.44

15793.13

1153.00

90940.00

GSP (in millions)

281033.96

337513.93

25438.00

1891363.00

Total medical spending
(state and non-state,
absolute-dollar)

7296897552

9308572364

526237765

49368510253

Violent crimes per
100,000 civilians

382.0340000

158.5698952

119.8000000

702.2000000

Homelessness (%)

0.2152000

0.1727005

0.0700000

1.0400000

Medicaid spending on
Mental Health (%)

0.0350829

0.0327000

0

0.1230674

Federal Medicaid
Multiplier

.7000620

.0725347

0.5878000

0.8424000

Population

5554885.14

6223254.09

345064.00

33871648

Medicaid Spending
Per-Capita

1466.26

1482.26

692.1049750

11411.23

Corrections Spending
Per-Capita (in millions)

0.000187160

0.000192895

0.000070401

0.0014519

GSP Per-Capita (in
millions)

0.0575508

0.0568705

0.0337141

0.4456507
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CHAPTER 4

ASSUMPTIONS

The literature review served not only to direct data collection but also the assumptions of the
model when interpreting that data. From the literature, the following assumptions were made.
Assumption 1: States will opt for the most efficient cost-benefit ratio possible. Claims of
perverse incentives only function insofar as state officers react to those incentives in an attempt to
maximize their utility.
Assumption 2: Untreated mental illness will express itself via a “social harm.” Note that this
assumption is not that all untreated mental illness expresses itself so, but that the rate at which
this does so should be constant or with a zero-error term across the states.
Assumption 3: Unmeasured variables not within state control have an error term of zero. This
assumption is purely pragmatic and necessary for analysis of the model, but accounts for potential
variation in the true mentally ill population of states. The assumption is that the distribution
across fifty observations is normal.

16

Assumption 4: Spending is a sufficient proxy for quality of care by the states. A conversation
about healthcare economics with Dr. Zimmer of the WKU economics department indicated that
spending is not a perfect measure but is often the best when conducting this type of study.

Figure 4.1: The Underlying Model

Exogenous factors:
GSP
Poverty
Population

US Federal Government

Medicaid

State Priorities

Quality of Treatment

Crime
Unemployment
Incarceration

17

Serious Mental Illness

CHAPTER 5

FINDINGS
Mental Health Spending per Capita as a linear function of GSP per capita, the cost of
overall hospital inpatient care per day, and the federal Medicaid multiplier for the year
2006
This model was run to test the relationship which exists between the state and the size of
the treatment budget. While the null was one of no relationship, the theory was that Medicaid
would sabotage this relationship and exhibit a negative correlation once other factors were held
constant.
Figure 5.1 indicates a study of all 50 states in 2006 which meets the expected
directionality of most items. According to the linear model, an increase in GSP per capita is
accompanied with a marginal increase in mental health spending per capita, although the amount
by which it does so is negligible and below the value of statistical significance. Likewise, the
federal Medicaid multiplier has a negative correlation with mental health expenditure per capita,
albeit it too is not statistically significant. The variable for inpatient costs in hospitals, designed
to measure the effect of hospital costs on state choice, seems to have a positive correlation with
mental health spending, going against what we know about the law of demand. To add insult to
18

injury, it has the largest t value in the entire regression. Critical T for rejection of the null was
2.02; no factor in the model meets this threshold. This last variable can be explained if one
assumes that assumption 1 was not entirely correct. Public choice would indicate that states,
unlike private entities, set goals in a manner which is insular to the law of demand. In this case, it
makes sense that high-cost states spend more on treatment – they are simply absorbing the higher
costs directly into their budgets.
The R-square and adjusted R-square values are not surprising in this context.
The Adjusted R-square value of .0684 demonstrates how ineffective the model is at explaining
state mental health spending. Omitted variable bias is likely an explanation for the factor on
inpatient costs, but even with such a variable, the situation is not as clear-cut as the Treatment
Advocacy Center indicates. This tenuous relationship certainly highlights the value of continued
observation, but casts doubt on later models which are predicated on the assumption that the
Medicaid program’s influence is greater than it truly is.

19

Figure 5.1: Mental Health Agency Spending per capita as a function of GSP per capita, Inpatient
Hospital costs, and the federal share of Medicaid spending
Variable

Coefficient

T-value

Intercept

103.82821

0.62

GSP Per-Capita

0.00072789

0.47

Inpatient Treatment Costs

0.02980

1.12

Federal Medicaid Share

-126.33514

-0.76

R-Square = 0.1255; Adjusted R-Square = 0.0684
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Crime per capita as a linear function of mental health spending per capita, GSP per capita,
the natural log of state population, and the federal Medicaid multiplier for the year 2006
This model is a test of the treatment programs themselves, and relies on the assumption
of expression. Theory posits that untreated mental illness expresses itself via crime,
unemployment, and homelessness. Adequate treatment is often defended on the grounds that it
keeps the mentally ill out of prison. The regression does not seem to indicate that the mental
health system has a significant impact on crime per capita, but findings are nevertheless
interesting.
The model seems to be much more explanatory than the previous, with an R-square value
of .396 and an adjusted R-square of .342. Critical T remains at 2.02 for rejection of the null with
95 percent confidence. Among the variables, mental health spending per-capita holds a sign
consistent with expectations in that a marginal increase in such spending is accompanied with a
decrease of -.00000287 violent crimes per 100,000 individuals, or -.287 per capita. However,
with a t value of -.84, it is not sufficient to reject the null hypothesis. The value of GSP percapita has a small but highly significant relationship with crime, yet runs in the opposite direction
of prevailing theory that wealth decreases incentives to crime. This measure does not take into
account stratification of state wealth, however, and should not be taken on its own as a rejection
of common theory on this relationship. For instance, states with high wealth and high poverty
(such as New York) may experience greater crime than states with lower overall wealth but far
less poverty. The variable for the natural log of population demonstrates that a growth in state
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population by one percent is accompanied with an increase in violent crime on the order of .126
incidents per 100,000 people. With a t-value of 2.53, it also exceeds the critical threshold for
rejection of the null, and seems to fit the notion that higher-population states have more
opportunities to bump shoulders. The federal Medicaid multiplier, which measures the amount of
Medicaid costs in the state borne by the federal government, is also statistically significant in its
positive relationship with crime. According to the model, a percentage point increase in the
federal share is accompanied with an increase of .0196 violent acts per 100,000 citizens.
Although such a finding makes this researcher happy, odd directionality in the rest of the model is
a call to skepticism. Moreover, the inability of the previous model to demonstrate the federal
Medicaid program’s ability to sway state decision-making makes it difficult to take this
conclusion as causal evidence rather than incidental. More research is needed.
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Figure 5.2: Violent crimes per 100,000 citizens as a function of state mental health spending percapita, GSP per capita, the natural log of the population, and the federal government share of
Medicaid spending, 2006
Variable

Coefficient

T-value

Intercept

-0.02337

-3.80

MHA Spending Per-Capita

-0.00000287

-0.84

GSP Per-Capita

0.000000186

4.90

Log(Population)

0.00126

2.53

Federal Share of Medicaid

0.01957

4.73

R-Square = 0.3957; Adjusted R-Square = 0.3419
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Violent crime per 100,000 citizens as a linear function of the per-capita share of the state
corrections budget, the proportion of citizens living below the poverty line, per-capita
Medicaid spending, and GSP per capita for the year 2009
This model is another expression of the previous, this time using violent crime (a favored
statistic, since violent crime is somewhat less rational and a better measure of untreated severe
mental illness) as the dependent variable. Poverty data was available for this year and was an
input for violent crime to hold external variables constant.
Adjusted R-squared for this model is .29, indicating that statistically significant variables
in the model are worth the attention of policymakers. For the model, the impact of Medicaid on
crime is dwarfed by that of poverty. The corrections budget has a weak but positive correlation
with violent crime rates as one would expect. Since corrections affects violence by working to
deter it while violence encourages the state to expand the program, it is not surprising to find that
each thousand-dollar increase in per-capita corrections spending is accompanied with an increase
of .583 crimes per 100,000 citizens. The t-value is below significance, likely due to a conflicted
relationship between the variables. The variable for poverty is absurd, with an indication that an
increase in the poverty rate by one percent accounts for an additional 2398 crimes per 100,000
citizens, an unrealistically large number. At 4.32, its t-value is above the rate for rejection of the
null. That this is unrealistic number is the most significant variable seems to indicate a flaw in
the model more than anything else – all data here should be treated with skepticism. Medicaid
spending per capita has a weak but negative relationship on crime. According to the model, an
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increase in 1000 medicaid dollars per capita is correlated with a decrease of -.0379 violent crimes
per 1,000 people. With a t-value of -.7, it fails to meet our needs for rejection of the null. The
marginal thousand-dollar increase in GSP per capita accounts for an increase of .00341 violent
crimes per 100,000 citizens. With a t-value of 1.29, it fails to reject the null of the relationship.
The implications of this model are that state policymakers are still likely correct to focus their
efforts at relieving poverty in order to reduce crime. The rhetoric of the Treatment Advocacy
Center, which attempts to use crime studies to bring citizen concern to their interests, could
backfire if violence prevention becomes the justification for mental health policy. States have a
responsibility to provide adequate care for the severely mentally ill, but their other priorities may
necessitate spending more time focusing on the factors that greatly influence crime; a hard lesson
for mental illness advocates.
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Figure 5.3: Violent crime per 100,000 citizens as a linear function of the per-capita share of the
state corrections budget, the proportion of citizens living below the poverty line, per-capita
Medicaid spending, and GSP per capita for the year 2009
Variable

Coefficient

T-value

Intercept

-256.83982

-1.49

Corrections Spending PerCapita

0.58340

1.46

% below poverty line

2398.54290

4.32

Medicaid spending per-capita

-0.03785

-0.70

GSP Per-Capita

0.00341

1.29

R-Square = 0.3512; Adjusted R-Square = 0.2935
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State expenditure on mental hospitals as a function of state expenditure on community care,
the federal Medicaid multiplier, Gross State Product, and hospital care expenses via panel
data for years 2006-2008
This random effects panel was conducted from 2006 to 2008 across states because of the
tumultuous time period that took place during the observations. The bubble in 2006, which burst
in 2007, led to the start of a rough economic crisis in 2008. By assuming that state identities and
priorities were radically changed during this time, the model held that external factors were at
play.
The purpose of this model was to test state responsiveness to federal Medicaid incentives
over time. If the literature review is true, an increase in the federal share of Medicaid should
encourage states to increase the share of community-based care at the expense of their state-run
institutions, which are not Medicaid-eligible. The basic panel regression finds that an m-value of
9.62 is sufficient to reject the null hypothesis for the model at 95 percent confidence. However,
while the federal share of Medicaid expenditures has a negative correlation with state hospital
expenditures, the t-value is nowhere near the rejection range and cannot be counted on to explain
the model. The presence of community care, which is collinear, indicates very simply that large
states spend more on both programs, and after examination the decision was made to run a second
panel regression which used the ratio of state-to-community care as a dependent variable rather
than have a factor which could take significance from other factors. It is nevertheless worth
noting that aside from the weak correlation with hospital expenses, gross state product was also a
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strong predictor, meaning that states tend to spend on mental health with some consistency to the
overall budget.
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Figure 5.4: State expenditure on mental hospitals as a function of state expenditure on community
care, the federal Medicaid multiplier, Gross State Product, and hospital care expenses via panel
data for years 2006-2008. (RanTwo estimation method)
Variable

Coefficient

T-value

Intercept

7.529864

0.07

CMHC spending

0.077502

4.56

Federal Medicaid Share

-80.2261

-0.51

GSP

0.00053

7.49

Hospital Expenses

0.02352

1.07

R-Square = 0.5484
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State expenditure on mental hospitals as a function of the federal Medicaid multiplier,
Gross State Product, and the number of food stamp enrollees for the years 2006, 2007, and
2008 separately
In order to better understand the data within the panel, each year was run as a separate
regression in addition to the original model. If the IMD exemption truly exhibits a perverse
incentive that affects state calculus, the relationship ought to express itself in multiple models.
In the year 2006, Gross State Product remains the most significant predictor of state
expenditures on hospital care. With a t-value of 4.3 and a rejection threshold of 2.2, the marginal
value of GSP, small as it may be, is strong. The federal government’s Medicaid share is once
again weak but negative, establishing a pattern in this research of non-rejection yet justifying the
call for further study. The t-value of -1.24 does not give sufficient reason to claim that the
model’s prediction that a percentage point increase in federal share decreases state expenditures
on hospital care by 296 dollars. The variable for food stamps, which attempted to get at the
measure for poverty, has a t value of 0.04 and is not sufficiently intriguing to warrant discussion.
The R-square adjusted value of .729 certainly gives the model some credibility, though it seems
to be overshadowed by GSP.
For the year 2007, the R-square of the model drops while the adjusted R-square increases
to .755. For the model GSP is once again highly significant, the federal share in Medicaid is weak
but negative (this time representing a 254 dollar decrease in state hospital funding for each
percentage point rise in federal government Medicaid share), and food stamps remain
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insignificant. However, heteroskedasticity is confirmed with a chi-square value of 29.72. With
white’s correction, conclusions based on t-values do not change, although the federal Medicaid
share gains some small bonus to significance with a t-value of -1.39.
For the year 2008, R-square and adjusted R-square valued increase such that adjusted Rsquare is .794. Data once again confirms GSP as the most significant variable, federal Medicaid
share as negative but weak, and food stamps as insignificant.
Per-capita data was not available over the course of the regression. The normal method
of utilizing census data and finding an estimate for population was not satisfactory during the
time period because of the unpredictability of population movement over the course of the
financial crisis. Instead, large factors that exist independent of per-capita data were used. While
this reduces bias and the amount of guesswork involved, it also makes it more difficult for models
to escape the role of raw population size.
Note the decreasing significance of the Medicaid program over the course of time. This
could imply that a former perverse incentive is reaching a plateau – it may have been a major
factor in the past, and is only beginning to dwindle. Data used for this paper is unable to
comment either way on the potential “plateau effect” but does serve to indicate an area ripe for
future research.
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Figure 5.5: State expenditure on mental hospitals as a function of the federal Medicaid multiplier,
Gross State Product, and the number of food stamp enrollees for the year 2006
Variable

Coefficient

T-value

Intercept

208.83356

1.42

Federal Share of Medicaid

-296.51523

-1.24

GSP

0.00052701

4.30

% of Population on Food
Stamps

0.00000284

0.04

R-Square = 0.7462; Adjusted R-Square = 0.7293
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Figure 5.6: State expenditure on mental hospitals as a function of the federal Medicaid multiplier,
Gross State Product, and the number of food stamp enrollees for the year 2007 (after White’s
Correction for Heteroskedasticity (p=.05))
Variable

Coefficient

T-value

Intercept

180.29283

1.78

Federal Share of Medicaid

-254.69513

-1.39

GSP

0.00055408

4.25

% of Population on Food
Stamps

0.00000102

0.01

R-Square = 0.7700; Adjusted R-Square = 0.7546
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Figure 5.7: State expenditure on mental hospitals as a function of the federal Medicaid multiplier,
Gross State Product, and the number of food stamp enrollees for the year 2008
Variable

Coefficient

T-value

Intercept

143.79093

1.00

Federal Share of Medicaid

-203.69566

-0.86

GSP

0.00066798

5.26

% of Population on Food
Stamps

0.000003714

-0.50

R-Square = 0.8064; Adjusted R-Square = 0.7935
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IMD to Community Care Ratio as a function of Federal share of Medicaid costs and
Gross State Product, 2006 through 2008
A model that attempts to explain state ratio of IMD spending to community care spending
by the federal government’s Medicaid share is surprisingly ineffective, giving paucity to anybody
assuming that the federal government and not the states are responsible for institutional shifts.
Conclusions on the strength of federal share and GSP remain the same as in the prior discussion
with the simple alteration that the model no longer enjoys the simple benefit from the relationship
between GSP and raw program size.
The motives for the simple model were to examine on the broader level whether or not a
basic relationship existed. Of course, other variables greatly affect the output of the model, but
the extremely low R-Square values indicate that advocates should focus their time on matters
other than the Medicaid exemption, which appears to have little impact in modern times on state
expenditures. In fact, from 2006 to 2008, the federal share of Medicaid had a positive
relationship on state expenditure on IMDs, contrary to the expectations of the model. Perhaps
states do set their agendas independent of the influence of the federal government. Once more
one thinks of public choice analysis, whereby the state does not respond to incentives the way a
rational market actor would.
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Figure 5.8: IMD to Community Care Ratio as a function of Federal share of Medicaid
costs and Gross State Product, 2006
Variable

Coefficient

T-value

Intercept

-0.11377

-0.24

Federal Share of Medicaid

1.16442

-1.54

GSP

0.0000000589796

-0.32

R-Square = 0.0663; Adjusted R-Square = 0.0257
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Figure 5.9: IMD to Community Care Ratio as a function of Federal share of Medicaid
costs and Gross State Product, 2007
Variable

Coefficient

T-value

Intercept

-0.09247

-0.19

Federal Share of Medicaid

1.08157

1.39

GSP

0.0000000250173

-0.14

R-Square = 0.0496; Adjusted R-Square = 0.0073
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Figure 5.10: IMD to Community Care Ratio as a function of Federal share of Medicaid
costs and Gross State Product, 2008
Variable

Coefficient

T-value

Intercept

-0.0228

-0.01

Federal Share of Medicaid

0.87379

1.32

GSP

0.000000004274

-0.03

R-Square = 0.0410; Adjusted R-Square = -0.0007
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CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

Conclusions can be difficult to draw even for models that were statistically significant
due to bias in data selection. A longer view on the time frame of events may yield greater
understanding than the experiment conducted here. Advocates for mental health reform can opt
to either take the findings as a sign of the reversal of an old trend or as a call for improved study.
This researcher believes the truth to be some combination of the two.
Without statistical significance in any area, the federal government’s share in Medicaid
does not seem to be the strongest predictor of state actions nor is it predictive of the actions of
society at large, where one would expect the mentally ill to express gaps in treatment. Three
explanations are possible: No relationship exists, a relationship exists but was obscured by bias in
the data, or a relationship exists but was obscured by an assumption which is not true. Perhaps
the mentally ill do not gain treatment the same way that one would expect, or perhaps they do not
act out in predictable ways when their illness remains untreated. Moreover, perhaps states are
now more genuinely concerned with high-quality care than they are with bending to the Medicaid
incentives put forth by the federal government. However, one should not be brash to make such a
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call one way or another. Instead, future research projects should attempt to better examine the
assumptions which are anecdotally common but rare on the macroeconomic level.
Maintenance of the null is also a call to skepticism of those who use claims of a
relationship to advocate their legislative agenda. It is entirely understandable why a mental
health treatment advocate would claim that the federal IMD exclusion in Medicaid causes
problems, yet economists have a duty to examine these claims. At the same time that we
approach matters of advocacy with healthy skepticism, the data should not stand in the place of a
meaningful discussion on federal policies. That many mentally ill live in our nation’s jails is
undeniable, and so long as the criminalization of mental illness is widespread, clarification and
research are in the best interests of all.
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CHAPTER 7

FUTURE WORK
Missing data and inability to accurately break state expenditures into per-capita variables
prevent the null confirmation to have a lasting effect. Future work in the area should begin with
wider availability of data on the behalf of the states. If the small investment of increasing
availability were made, economists and advocates alike would be better-positioned to make
rational claims with lasting merit.
Survey methods were the most frequently used by treatment advocates, which has
contributed to the lack of working data for this study. Great attention must be given to the
macroeconomic variables that affect the state’s relationship with mental illness. For instance,
accurate data on hospital beds is more available for the decade 1990-2000 than from 2000-2010,
but is harder to study due to the lack of readily accessible data for the most recent decade.
Greater emphasis will be given to studying alternative models of expression – for
instance, adding to the model which predicts homelessness, as data on the phenomenon is
becoming magnitudes more accurate and accessible. This variable should be preferred over
violence because it seems to be less immune to the culture of one state, more responsive to law
than to culture, and because mental illness accounts for a larger proportion of the homeless
population. A robust model of this sort would likely reflect the true nature of the Federal
Medicaid incentive structure’s authority over state expenditure.
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